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I. INTRODUCTION
Article XIX of the GATT permits contracting parties to escape
their GATT obligations and raise trade barriers to safeguard any of
their producers seriously injured by an increase in imports.' However,
recent criticism has pointed out that "[d]issatisfaction with article XIX
of the GATT in its current form is rife, and the need for reform is well
accepted. The article has been largely bypassed as countries do what
the article does not permit them to do: selectively discriminate against
supplying countries in the application of trade barriers ..... "2 International trade statistics support criticism of article XIX on the ground
that "many countries use safeguards selectively, shutting out only certain countries or suppliers."3 In fact, selective safeguard measures, according to GATT statistics "currently show some 270 such measures in
effect . . . . Voluntary restraint agreements are the safeguard
meausures used most often, according to GATT statistics-77 at last
count." 4 "Numerous GATT signatories, especially the United States,
the European Community, Canada and Australia, have invoked Article XIX to afford protection to a range of 'injured' industries."5 The
Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations attempted to deal with the
safeguards problem. However, the Uruguay Round "addressed but
failed to resolve ongoing problems with the Safeguard Clause." 6 Article XIX of the GATT has been characterized as "the Achilles heel of
multilateral trade negotiations for the past fifteen years and will con7
tinue to be so for the years to come."
This article analyzes Article XIX of the GATT by exploring the
legal requirements of safeguard measures in the GATT, and then addresses the different positions taken during the Uruguay Round by
the United States, the European Community and Developing Countries. As voluntary restraint agreements proliferate (the terms VER
and VRA are used synonomously in this paper), the GATT itself may
1. Alan 0. Sykes, Protectionismas a "Safeguard" A PositiveAnalysis of the GAYT
"Escape Clause" with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHmc. L. REv., 255, 256
(1991).
2. Gary Sampson, Safeguards, in THE URUGUAY ROUND:

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

A HANDBOOK FOR THE

MULnATERAL TRADE NEGoriATiONs 143 (J. Michael Finger & Andrzej
Olechowski eds., 1987).
UruguayRound NegotiatorsBegin Talks On ProposedText ForSafeguards Pact,
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) Vol. 6, No. 34, at 869 (July 5, 1989)[hereinafter Uruguay
Talks].
Id.
Sykes, supra note 1, at 256.
Eric C. Emerson, VoluntaryRestraintAgreements and DemocraticDecisionmaking, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 281, 298 (1991).
Sampson, supra note 2, at 143.
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weaken as more countries ignore Article XIX and take selective action. This article analyzes the need to strengthen Article XIX because
of the "breakdown of the so-called 'escape clause' or safeguards provisions (Article 19) of the GATT."8 Before addressing the ramifications
of the Uruguay Round on Article XIX, it is necessary to explore the
actual legal requirements of safeguard action within the GATT.
II. THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS OF SAFEGUARD ACTION
UNDER GATT ARTICLE XIX
Article XIX(1)(a) states:
If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff
concessions, any product is being imported into the territory of that contracting party in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to
cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers in that territory of like
or directly competitive products, the contracting party shall be free.... for
such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend
9
the obligation in whole or in part.

The history of the actual legal requirements of this article reveals
how truly relaxed they have become.
An "Unforeseen Development" Is No Longer an Article XIX
Requirement

A.

The "unforeseen development" requirement has little meaning.
After the Hatters' Fur case, in which a change in ladies' hat styles
constituted an unforeseen development, the degree of a given import's
impact will always be "unforeseeable."10 The unforeseen developments requirement has been read out of existence under the GATT."
B.

The "Increased Imports" Requirement is a Nullity

According to Article XIX, "the increased quantities of imports"
must result from "unforeseen developments" and from "the effect of
obligations incurred under the Agreement." A recent commentator
has stated: "[t]hese provisions pose interesting interpretive problems,
and modem GATT practice has converged on an interpretation that
renders both virtual nuflities."'12
8. ROBERT E. BALDWIN, TRADE POLICY IN A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY, 227 (1988).

9. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, article IX, openedforsignatureOct.
30, 1947, 61 Stat. 43, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
10. Ruth E. Olson, GATT-Legal Application of Safeguards in the Context of Regional
Trade Arrangements and its Implications for the Canada-United States Free
Trade Agreement, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1488, 1502 n.47 (1989).
11. Robert E. Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement After the Tokyo Round: An Unfinished Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145, 161 (1980).
12. Sykes, supra note 1, at 287.
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C. There is No Need to Show Causation Under Article XIX
The text of Article XIX states that the safeguard measure may be
invoked when the increased imports "cause or threaten" serious injury. However, it has generally been an easy matter to invoke Article
XIX "without showing much of a causal relationship."13 Some commentators note that Article XIX may not have any requirement of
causation at all, and that the only real condition for invoking Article
XIX is the existence of injury.14 The recent Uruguay Round created a
draft Agreement on Safeguards which "omits any requirement of
linkage between increased quantities and GATT obligations."'s
D.

The Definition of "Serious Injury" Within Article XIX is Ambiguous

The GATT itself gives no guidance on what constitutes serious injury.16 To meet the Article XIX "serious injury" requirement, a caseby-case analysis is required. 17 An early GATT Working Party decision
established that an exporter challenging Article XIX safeguards has
the burden of proof on the issue of "serious injury."' 8 Some commentators believe that "serious injury" in Article XIX means the same
thing as "material injury" in Article VI of the GATT.19 Material injury is any "injury that is more than de minimis."20 De minimis injury occurs when market penetration is five percent or less.2 ' Thus,
the definition of "serious injury" remains vague and the country invoking the safeguard measure has a relatively easy time defending itself on this issue. In fact, after the current Uruguay Round, "the draft
Agreement on Safeguards imposes no meaningful constraints upon
the ability of signatories to interpret the 'serious injury' requirement
13. Howard ML Liebman, GATT and Countertrade Requirements, 18 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 252, 258 (1984).
14. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Fairor Unfair Trade: Does it Matter?, 13 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 205, 218 (1980).
15. Sykes, supra note 1, at 288.
16. Michael W. Lochmann, The Japanese Voluntary Restraint on Automobile Exports: An Abandonment of the Free Trade Principlesof the GAT and the Free
Market Principles of United States Antitrust Laws, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 99, 123
(1986).
17. Rochelle A. Fandel, The Response of 'M'scape Clause" of GATT and Section 201 of
the Tariffand TradeAct of 1974 to the Needs ofDeveloping Countries, 17 CAL W.
INT'L L.J. 208, 217 (1987).
18. Loretta Lundy, The GAIT Safeguards Debacle and the Canadian Textiles and
ClothingPolicy: A Proposalfor an EquitableApproach to North-South Relations,
22 J. WORLD TRADE 71, 74 (Dec. 1988).
19. Lowenfeld, supra note 14, at 218.
20. Peter D. Staple, Implementing "Tokyo Round" Commitments: The New Injury
Standardin Antidumping and CountervailingDuty Laws, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1183,
1195 (1980).
21. Id.
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as they wish."2 2 "Article XIX could be greatly improved by changing
the interpretation of a serious injury. Giving economic content to serious injury by considering the economy-wide implications of protection
holds the key to reform."23 For example, "one group of proposals
would limit findings of 'serious injury' to cases of extensive unemployment or underemployment in the import-competing industry."24 If
there were objective criteria to be evaluated when a country invoked
Article XIX, contracting parties could feel that safeguard measures
are less arbitrary and selective.
E. Article XIX Safeguard Measures do not Seem to Require Adherence
to the MFN Principle
Although numerous law review articles argue that "safeguard
measures must apply according to the MFN principle,"25 there is considerable evidence from the language and the practice of Article XIX
itself which suggests the contrary. Article XIX "does not explicitly
require non discriminatory application."26 Not only does the language
of Article XIX permit discriminatory application of its provisions, "in
practice a large measure of discrimination is condoned by the GATT
Contracting Parties." 27 Discriminatory Article XIX safeguard measures "are and have been quite common in GATT practice." 28 From
the beginning, "GATT members have found ways to discriminate
when they safeguard their domestic industries. This practice is a propensity that has accelerated dramatically in the last decade."29 In fact,
at the recent Uruguay Round meetings, officials from United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) noted the "growing disregard of GATT's Article XIX, which provides for protective
action in cases of emergency, particularly what they see as growing
circumvention of the most-favored-nation requirement in applying restrictions." 3 0 The problem of selectively using safeguards was not directly addressed at the Uruguay Round: "Sources within the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade pointed out that the safeguards text
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Sykes, supra note 1, at 291.
Sampson, supra note 2, at 150.
Sykes, supra note 1, at 291.
Olson, supra note 10, at 1502.
Id. at 1502 n.49.
Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, Reconsidering the Non-DiscriminationPrincipleas Applied to GAP SafeguardMeasures: A Rejoinder,1983/2 LEGAL IsSUEs Eus. INTEGRATION 113, 127.

28. Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, The Non-DiscriminatoryApplication of Article XIX
GAT- Traditionor Fiction?, 1981/2 LEGAL IssuEs Eut. INTERATION 35, 53.
29. Alan C. Swan, The "EscapeClause" and the Safeguards Wrangle, 1989 B.Y.U. L.
REv. 431, 435.
30. GATT: Developing Countries Uneasy Over Progressof UruguayRound Negotiations, UNCTAD Says, 6 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1314 (Oct. 11, 1989) [hereinafter
Developing Countries].
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agreed to July 6 does not address such subjects as selectivity of safeguards ... ,"31 Other commentators such as Robert Baldwin have
noted that there is "greater danger in accepting selectivity than in allowing continuation of the current situation ... selective controls
32
would eventually lead to more generalized protective regimes ...
The intent of Article XIX with regard to non-discrimination is ambiguous. "[Tihe General Agreement contains no interpretative material on Article XIX."33 "[T]he preparatory work of Article XIX(1)
does not support a particular interpretation."3 4 Thus, the intent, the
language, and the actual practice of Article XIX seem to allow discriminatory or selective use of safeguard measures. Despite all of
these facts, the current authoritative view of Article XIX is that it
requires a non-discriminatory interpretation because of a 1980 GATT
Panel Decision which asserted for the first time that quantitative restrictions need "non-discriminatory administration."3 5 Given the analysis of the legal requirements of Article XIX, it appears that countries
can unilaterally determine the necessity for safeguards and can "impose them without any kind of prior GATT approval." 36
F. The Compensation/Retaliation Problem Under Article XIX
GATT Article XIX(2) states: "Before any contracting party shall
take action.., it shall give notice in writing... as far in advance as
may be practicable and shall afford... those contracting parties having a substantial interest as exporters ... an opportunity to consult."
This means that a party taking safeguard action under Article XIX
should "negotiate over the possibility of compensation ....It further
authorizes measured retaliation when those negotiations fail ... "37
GATT Article XIX(3) allows "adversely affected states" to impose
"countermeasures" to prevent or remedy the injury if delay would
cause irreparable injury to their domestic producers. These provisions
of Article XIX have also been circumvented. "In recent years, many
governments have avoided the obligation of compensating other countries with reductions in protection on other product lines (or risk retaliation) by negotiating orderly marketing agreements or voluntary
31. Uruguay Round Group on SafeguardsAgrees to Draft Text For TNC Meetings, 7
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1067 (July 11, 1990).
32. WLiAM R. CLINE, TRADE POLICY IN THE 1980s at 31 (1983).
33. Mark Koulen, The Non-DiscriminatoryInterpretationof GAIT Article XIX(1):
A Reply, 1983/2 LEGAL ISSUES EUR INTEGRATION 87, 90.
34. Id- at 91.
35. MARco C.E.J. BRONCKERS, SELECTIVE SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN MULTILATERAL

TRADE RELATIONS: ISSUES OF PROTECTIONISM IN GATr EUROPEAN CoMMuNurY
AND UNITED STATES LAW at 81 (1985).
36. Olson, supra note 10, at 1507.
37. Sykes, supra note 1, at 287.
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restraint agreements."38 However, recently commentators have been

"hostile to the compensation and retaliation provisions of Article
XIX."39 But the compensation and and retaliation provisions of Article XIX should not be abandoned40 because they make certain that
countries do not use Article XIX opportunistically or for frivolous reasons. In theory, "the advantage of the retaliation proviso seems to be
that it serves as a brake on protectionism." 41 Furthermore, "[t]he
GATT drafters intended contracting parties to use article XIX defensively in emergencies, not offensively to gain unfair trade advantages." 42 Thus it would be more consistent with the drafter's intent
under Article XIX not to abandon the retaliation and compensation
provisions which act as a check on protectionist trade barriers. "[I]f
Article XIX has indeed facilitated a significant number of concessions-a plausible though unverifiable proposition-its overall effect
on the welfare costs of protection may well have been favorable." 43
The compensation/retaliation provision operates in a way which controls the purely arbitrary use of safeguard measures.
III. THE ADVANTAGES OF STRENGTHENING ARTICLE XIX
According to recent commentary, "[t]he latest round of GATT negotiations, the Uruguay Round, addressed but failed to resolve ongoing problems with the Safeguard Clause." 44 Three distinct areas will
be examined with regard to strengthening the requirements of the
Safeguards Clause: the political and legal benefits of adhering to the
MFN principle in Article XIX; the economic benefits of adhering to
the MFN principle in Article XIX; and the benefits of creating a Surveillance Committee to insure that Safeguard Actions under Article
XIX are carried out in an objective manner.
A.

The Political and Legal Benefits of Requiring Adherence to the MFN
Principle in GATr Article XIX

Allowing continued use of selectivity in the application of Article
XIX will "worsen international political relations." 45 "In recent years,
the United States has sought to improve its credibility among the
GATT contracting parties in the hope of encouraging broader compliance with the GATT. United States compliance with GATT rules will
38. BALDwIN, supra note 8, at 227.
39. Sykes, supra note 1, at 295.
40. Id-at 298.
41. BRONCKERS, supra note 35, at 89.

42.
43.
44.
45.

Olson, supra note 10, at 1516.
Sykes, supra note 1, at 290.
Emerson, supra note 6, at 298.
BALDwiN, supra note 8, at 235.
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enhance this credibility."4 6 By using VRAs and selective safeguards,
the United States is perceived by many other GATT signatories as illegally circumventing the GATT. "The typical VRA runs afoul of article XIX... [because] frequently VRAs are negotiated without a prior
finding of injury."47 VRAs also violate the MFN (most favored nation) requirement of Article I because they are typically negotiated
with only one or two exporting nations.48 The use of VERs or VRAs
has proliferated in recent years and this can "undermine the legal authority of the GATT system, introduce the evils of discrimination into
a trading regime grounded in principles of nondiscrimnation among
trading partners, and afford protection of open-ended duration."49
Clearly, developing countries would favor a strong United States commitment to the MFN principle in Article XIX. As the Coordinator of
International Trade Programs at UNCTAD stated: "A clear-cut commitment to the MIFN principle for the introduction of protective measures is needed.., along with specific structural adjustment obligations
and objective criteria for action, which... would restore credibility to
the world trading system." 50 It is clear that developing countries
would be politically pleased by a strong U.S. commitment to the MFN
Principle in Article XIX: ".... . the developing countries want to refer
to the basic principles of GATT.'" 51 Other scholars have argued that
"the assurance that Article XIX is not to be applied 'selectively' is one
of the few, if not the only, significant reasons for developing countries
adhering to the GATT."52 Thus there are numerous political and legal

benefits accrued by revising the Safeguards Clause so that it clearly
requires adherence to the MFN principle. The United States is a signatory to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.-5 By continually negotiating VERs and by ignoring the MFN principle of Article
XIX, the U.S. undermines the "collective effort to create a fair trading
system."54 The Safeguard Code should be revised so that selectivity is
restricted and so that VRAs can be restrained because "VRAs are inconsistent with the traditional interpretation of Article XIX which
holds that safeguard measures have to be applied on a non-discriminatory basis ....

,,5

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Olson, supra note 10, at 1506.
Emerson, supra note 6, at 292.
Id at 293.
Sykes, supra note 1, at 257.
Developing Countries, supra note 30.
Agreement on Agriculture Within Reach as Uruguay Round Review Set to Resume, 6 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 412 (Apr. 5, 1989).
52. Rodney de C. Grey, A Note on U.S. Trade Practices,in TRADE PoLicY iNTHE
1980s, at 243, 249 (William R.Cline ed., 1983).
53. Emerson, supra note 6, at 291.
54. Id. at 292.
55. BRONCKERS, supra note 35, at 3.
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By complying with the terms of an international treaty to which
the U.S. is a signatory, credibility in the GATT is restored. Furthermore, a strict adherence to the MFN principle in Article XIX and a
commitment to restrict the growing use of VERs will also restore the
legal strength of GATT as fewer countries feel Article XIX is being
circumvented. By avoiding the selectivity problem in Article XIX, the
situation will worsen: "[t]he issue of selectivity still blocks a consensus on a new Safeguards Code, and undermines the authority of Article XIX."56 Developing countries would be pleased by a U.S.
commitment to the MFN principle in GATT Article XIX. The U.S.
realized this and at one point, "[t]he U.S. proposal suggested that safeguards be only offered on a most-favored-nation basis."57 Finally, "the
most convincing argument against selectivity, however, can be found
in the Leutwiler Report (GATT 1985, p.43)."58 That report argues:
"Article XIX is not a punishment for an offending exporter, but an
admission that the protected industry is not competitive.., a nondiscriminatory safeguard action affects all suppliers, actual and potential .... This concentrates the pressure for adjustment where it ought
to be--on the protecting country and the protected industry."59
B.

The Economic Benefits of a Stronger Safeguards Clause

According to many economists "considerable economic benefits ordinarily flow from adherence to the MFN principle." 60 The reason is
that "safeguard measures that discriminate against nations that increase their exports tend to penalize precisely those exporters that
have done the most to improve their efficiency, thus lessening the incentive to become more efficient." 61 Other commentators agree that
there would be economic advantages in requiring the Safeguard
Clause to be used on an MFN basis and restricting the use of VERs:
Donges (1984), the Scott Study Group of the Trade Policy Research Centre
(Scott, 1984), Aho and Aronson (1985), Curzon and Price (1985), the GATI
"Wisemen's" Group (Leutwiler et al., 1985) and Preeg (1985), believe that reductions in all forms of import barriers and export subsidies on a non-discriminatory basis across all commodities would create the most favourable
conditions for high, sustained rates of income and employment growth
throughout
the world economy and for harmonious political relations among
62
nations.

The economic benefits of requiring strict adherence to the =vIFN principle in Article XIX would be timely given that "GATT's economists
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id at 4.
Uruguay Talks, supra note 3, at 869.
Sampson, supra note 2, at 148.
Id.
Sykes, supra note 1, at 294.
IdBALDWIN, supra note 8, at 250.
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already have signaled a decline in the favorable growth rates in world
trade of the past few years." 63 However, the recent Uruguay Round
did not directly address the problem of selectivity and discrimination
in Article XIX thus missing the chance to gain economic advantages
under the GATT: "The draft Agreement on Safeguards does not resolve the issue directly. It provides that safeguard measures shall apply to product 'irrespective of their source,' except under exceptional
circumstances ... [which] indicate[s] its controversial and unsettled
status among the negotiators and the need for further high-level political discussions." 64
As noted, VRAs are proliferating and are seen as violating GATT
Article XIX. Another problem with VRAs is the excessive economic
costs associated with them. One estimate states that the cost to U.S.
consumers of the auto VRA was approximately $5.8 billion in 1984
alone.65 The reason "VERs are exceptionally expensive is because
they transfer much of the implicit tax on consumers abroad..."6
Thus, by cutting back on VRAs, GATT contracting parties could accrue economic benefits.
C. Multilateral Surveillance of Safeguard Action: Another Way to
Improve Article XIX of GATT
Currently, Article XIX "does not subject national safeguard measures to effective multilateral surveillance. Through the introduction
of a multilateral surveillance mechanism in a Safeguards Code, the
interests of importing and exporting countries could be balanced evenhandedly."67 This idea of a GATT Surveillance Committee on Safeguards is supported by other commentators. A Surveillance Committee would help draw "nations back into the framework of Article
XIX."68 An Article XIX Surveillance Committee would review all restrictive safeguard actions in an ex post manner: Governments would
notify the GATT Secretariat who would use objective economic criteria to determine serious injury and the appropriateness of the safeguard action. 69 Establishing an SSC (Safeguards Surveillance
Committee) for Article XIX could help bolster international trade
within the GATT framework. "By consistently exposing national im63. GATT Members Meet in FinalSession for 1990 Following Collapse of Uruguay
Round Talks, 8 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 23 (Jan. 2, 1991).
64. Sykes, supra note 1, at 293.
65. Emerson, supra note 6, at 292.
66. Martin Wolf, Why TradeLiberalizationis a Good Idea, in THE URUGUAY ROUND:
A HANDBOOK FOR THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 14, 18. (J. Michael
Finger & Andrzej Olechowski, eds., 1987).
67. BRONCKERS, supra note 35, at 71.

68. Harold B. Malmgren, Threats to the MultilateralSystem, in TRADE POUCY INTHE
1980s, at 189, 195 (William R. Cline ed., 1983).
69. IM
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port relief programs to international scrutiny, the SSC can help repel
protectionist tendencies."70 A Surveillance Committee would be beneficial in terms of enforcing Article XIX and "it would seem to be an
important function for a new Safeguards Code Committee to develop
"71

IV. THE DISADVANTAGES OF STRENGTHENING
ARTICLE XIX
Some commentators are more cautious when it comes to the selectivity problem in Article XIX. They argue "[t]he adoption of proposals to eliminate discriminatory safeguards actions might prove
counterproductive, as might the adoption of certain proposals to encourage greater use of Article XIX in preference to VERs."72 The
three main arguments made here are: 1) requiring the MFN principle
in Article XIX is against the language and practice of that Article;
2) VERs do not violate GATT prohibitions; 3) requiring the MFN
principle in Article XIX will not necessarily curtail the use of VERs.
A.

The Legal Problem with Requiring the MFN Principle in Safeguard
Actions Under Article XIX

The explicit language of Article XIX does not require non-discriminatory application.7 3 Not only does the language not require non-discriminatory application, but actual practice under the GATT has
allowed selective use of safeguards. 74 Thus, the language and practice
of Article XIX allow selective safeguard use. This analysis ignores a
1980 GATT panel decision which makes "non-discriminatory interpretation of Article = ...authoritative." 75 It also ignores the fact that
even those individuals who would like to see continued use of selective
safeguards admit that "GATT Article XIX is written so that safeguard
actions taken pursuant to its terms are to apply to all imports from all
sources under the MFN principle." 76 Despite prevailing legal opinion
and despite that 1980 GATT panel decision, these individuals maintain
that selectivity would be allowed based on a strict reading of the language of Article XIX itself, and based on past practice within the
GATT. Furthermore, if there is no AFN principle in Article XIX,
70. BRONCKERS, supra note 35, at 108.

71. Michael J. Trebilock, Reforming the GATT Safeguards Regime, 15 CANADIAN
Bus. L.J. 234, 240 (1989).
72. Sykes, supra note 1, at 259.
73. Sampson, supra note 2, at 150.
74. Olson, supra note 10, at 1502.
75. BRONCKERS, supra note 35, at 81.
76. Alan Win. Wolff, Need For New GATT Rules to Govern Safeguard Actions, in
TRADE POLICY IN THE 1980s, at 363, 376 (William R. Cline ed., 1983).
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then no legal violation occurs when countries selectively use the escape clause.
B. VERs are not Covered by the GATT
The main argument here is that VERs are not covered "by prohibitions in the GATT (e.g., Article XI) because they are voluntarily effectuated by the exporting countries." 77 Additionally, it is stated that
"many take the view that VRAs fall outside the GATT escape clause
regime."7 8 Thus, if VERs are not covered under Article XIX, it is impossible for them to violate that article. This view is also weak. Article I of the GATT requires "that stipulations in an agreement be
applied multilaterally and not on a country-by-country basis ....
[O]ne of the VRAs' strongest features ... was their selective application .... "79 In addition, "scholars do not disagree on the point that
actions taken outside the ambit of article XIX must conform to the
MFN principle, unless the GATT provides a waiver for discriminatory
treatment in furtherance of another policy."0 Thus, it appears the
stronger argument favors a view that VERs are not legal under the
GATT. However, proponents of the legality of VERs and selective use
of Article XIX often "cite a decision dating from 1949, where the
GATT Contracting Parties held, albeit in a different context, that the
determination of rights and obligations between governments arising
under a bilateral agreement is not a matter within the competence of
the Contracting Parties." 8 ' However, one GATT panel decision on a
matter which is "in a different context" seems an insufficient reason
to consider VERs legal and outside the purview of GATT.
C. Requiring the MFN Principle in Article XIX Safeguard Actions will
not End the Use of VERs
This argument states that since VERs have proliferated (a fact
made clear by statistics in the International Trade Reporter) a strict
reading of GATT Article XIX will not change behavior:
Selective actions must be allowed if the GATr rules are to govern conduct as
it actually exists now or will exist in the foreseeable future. This is necessary
not only to recognize reality-selective measures have become a more imporrules is hardly likely
tant form of import relief... failure to amend the GATT
to result in countries abandoning selective action. 82

But this seems to ignore another reality: developing countries are
77. BRONCKERS, supra note 35, at 92.
78. Id.
79. Tamera Fillinger, The Anatomy of Protectionism: The Voluntary Restraint
Agreements on Steel Imports, 35 UCLA L. REV. 953, 965 (1988).
80. Emerson, supra note 6, at 293.
81. BRONCKERS, supra note 35, at 71. (citing GATT II BISD 11, at 1 (1952)).
82. Wolff, supra note 76, at 380.
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not pleased with the growing use of VERs and selective safeguard
measures. This dissatisfaction causes a loss of credibility for the
GATT. In addition, proponents of VERs point out that there are some
economic benefits to VERs: "[e]xporting countries receive a bribe for
entering VERs in the form of quota rents, and may thus be quite content to enter them."8 3 However, it appears that in economic terms, a
strong commitment to the MFN principle in GATT Article XIX may
outweigh any economic gains which may accrue to nations involved in
VERs. Even those commentators who point out the beneficial quota
rents from VERs find that "[t]he net impact of selectivity on the economic welfare of the GATT community thus appears ambiguous."8 4
V. CONCLUSION
The "real issue in the Uruguay Round is whether the multilateral
trading system of GATT is going to be preserved... and if the system
is to be preserved, it must work better than it does now."as Article
XIX of the GATT needs reform. "VERs and OMAs tend to proliferate, and, more importantly, the volume of trade affected by them has
increased."8 6 In fact:
GATT has estimated that from 30 to 40 percent of the total non-oil exports of
developing countries come under some form of restraint [not just quantitative

restrictions] in entering the industrialized nations. Although article XIX
should govern quantitative restrictions (QRs) on these imports, more than
ninety percent
(by value) of all import-safeguard actions are handled outside
87
the GATT.

To restrain the growth of VERs and to add credibility to the GATT,
there needs to be a renewed commitment to the MFN principle.
"[A]cceptance of a conditional MFN will open the way for the introduction of more trade restrictions, both directly and through retaliatory actions, and will further undermine the GATT."88 A conditional
MFN results "in a more inefficient use of world resources and a consequent reduction in world income and growth rates as low-cost producers are replaced by high cost suppliers." 89 In addition, "selective
application would undermine one of the GATT's foremost principles
[MFN]. In practice, applying the same safeguard measure to all ex83. Sykes, supra note 1, at 296.
84. I& at 295.
85. William B. Kelly, Functioningof the GAYTSystem, in THE URUGUAY ROUND: A
HANDBOOK FOR THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 81,85 (J. Michael Finger & Andrzej Olechowski, eds., 1987).
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porters increases pressure on the country imposing the restriction to
remove it sooner." 90 Not only are there significant economic costs
from deviating from the MFN principle in article XIX, but there are
significant legal and political consequences to such deviation.
First, smaller trading countries "maintain that only through nondiscrimination in application of Article I would their interests and
rights be protected. The nondiscriminatory application of Article XIX
is the main attraction for smaller trading nations to adhere to the
GATT."91 Thus, allowing selectivity may encourage further breakdown in the GATT as developing countries feel that GATT rules are
not being followed. There is a "fear that any formal departure from
the unconditional MFN rule will result in all kinds of discrimination." 92 This fear could become realized unless the GATT contracting
parties strengthen Article XIX. The Uruguay Round provided the
"international community with a major opportunity to stem the deterioration in the international trading system."9 3 Although the United
States' "proposal suggested that safeguards only be offered on a mostfavored nation basis," 94 the Draft Agreement on Safeguards did not
directly end the selectivity problem with Article XIX. If the MFN
rule does truly exist as a legal requirement to safeguard action under
Article XIX, then that requirement should not be abandoned for
short-term political and economic gain. "If GATT rules and procedures are consistently overlooked, they will soon cease to be rules at
all."95 That pragmatic view realizes that "[t]he escape clause standard
of Article XIX should not be lowered; to do so would only increase
their [voluntary export restraints] use."96 As VERs increase, more
and more world trade is conducted outside the GATT framework and
in violation of its rules. But the
resolutions of trade disputes should be within the parameters of the rules negotiated and ratified... if they are not, world trade is misgoverned or, rather
ungoverned by ad hoc arrangements based on political needs of the moment.
without trade rules in the 1930s, with disastrous results for all
The world 9was
7
concerned.

Clearly, the United States is a signatory to the GATT and needs to
show that it adheres to the principles and rules of GATT. However,
the international statistics do not indicate such an adherence. In fact,
"[e]ighty percent of VRAs are designed to protect industry in the Eu90. Hackney and Shafer, supra note 87, at 227.
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ropean Community and the United States, according to GATT statistics .... ,,98 Legal analysis suggests that these restraints often violate
Article XIX and Article I of the GATT. These restraints need to be
restricted so as to restore legal confidence and credibility to the
GATT. "Respect for the System would be furthered if the General
Agreement were reviewed article by article."99 This is why "a satisfactory negotiation on safeguards is an essential element in restoring
the efficient functioning of the GATT system." 100 A commitment to
the MFN principle in safeguards, a revised definition of serious injury
which includes objective economic criteria, and a new surveillance
committee to examine safeguard actions are all necessary steps for a
stronger Article XIX and a stronger GATT system.
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